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NEW PUBLIC UTILiTrS-To use the familiar phraseology of
Lord Hale, when does a business "cease to be juris privati only"
and become "affected with a public interest,"' so that it may be
regulated as a public service? Before attmnpting to answer
this question, which has been variously ranswered by various
authorities and is not yet definitely settled,2 it will be well to
remember that all businesses, private and public, are, of course,
subject to governmental regulation of a sort. But there is in
one respect an important difference between the sort of govern-
mental regulation to which private businesses may be constitu-
tionally subjected and the sort of governmental regulation to
which public businesses may be constitutionally subjected.
The difference is not merely one of degree; it is one
of kind. Generally speaking, governmental regulations in
regard to private business are negative in character; govern-
' De Portibus Maris, 1 HARG. LAw TRACTS 78.
2 See Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Public Service Commission, 84 W. Va. 638,
100 S. E. 551 (1919). See, discussing the point and taking opposite views: Wyman.
"The Law of Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem". 17 HARV. L. REV.
156, 217; Burdick, "The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies,"
11 COL. L. REV. 515, 616, 743. Cr. 31 YALE L. J. 75-78. See Hough, J., in Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 269 Fed. 306, 317 (1920).
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mental regulations in regard to public business, that is, in addi-
tion to negative regulations generally applicable to private
business, are positive in character. The law says to those en-
gaged in private enterprises: In conducting your business
you must not do this or that, e. g., sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas,1 which maxim is in essence a negative requirement not
to use one's own so as to injure another. But to those engaged
in 'public businesses the law also says (or may say) : In conduct-
ing your business you must do this or that, e. g., you must serve
all, as a rule, and you must serve for a reasonable compensation.
Of course, these positive duties in public service law may differ
in regard to different public businesses, 4 just as negative duties
may differ in regard to different private businesses. But there
is this fundamental distinction between the two classes of business,
viz., that the 'law peculiarly applicable to public business is coercive,
imposing positive duties, while the law peculiarly applicable to
private business is restraining imposing negative duties.'
From the time of our earliest reports the courts have classified
commercial enterprises into these two categories and have applied
quite different rules of law to each class of business. In medieval
times the list of public businesses was long,6 while only a few years
ago practically all businesses except two had, for various reasons,
fallen into the category of private callings, only common carriage
and innkeeping fully retaining their public character.7  Today,
the list of public businesses, commonly called public utilities, in-
eludes, many, if not most, of the big modern businesses, and the
length of the list is growing almost daily. The original question
thus arises: When does a business which was always considered
private, or was once considered public but later considered private,
"cease to be juris privati only" and become "affected with a public
interest?" Some say that, except as to innkeeping and common
carriage, there must be either legislation that regulates the business
(or declares it a public service) or an exercise of a public franchise
by such a business before it can be held to be a public utility.8
This, however, seems unsound, for, among other reasons, it does
Wilson P. Phoenix Powder Mfg. Co., 40 W. Va. 413, 417, 21 S. E. 1035 (1895);
Munn -v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 124, 125 (1876).
' German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 407 (1914).
See BEALE & WYMAN, RAILROAD RATE REGULATION, 2 ed., § 4; 1 WYMAN, PUBLIC
SERVICE CORPORATIONS, § 38.
S ee 1 WYMAi, op. cit., ch. 1.
' See Burdick, op. cit.
' State ex rel. Star Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 s. W. 91(1901); Ladd v. Southern Cotton & Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880). See Burdick,
op. cit.
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.pot satisfactorily account for innkeeping and common carriage,
the great examples of public utilities which are public utilities
without legislation or exercise of franchises, and it is contra to
considerable authority.9 The sounder view, supported by the
reasoning in the leading cases,'" seems to be that neither of these
two elements is necessary and that in order to have a public
utility it is sufficient to have (1) a business public in character,
i. e., a business both (a) monopolistic in character-a "virtual
monopoly,""" not necessarily a legal or absolute monopoly, and (b)
essential to the welfare of the public, and (2) a holding out to
serve the public generally,"2 or, more accurately to serve a per-
missible class, for the public of every public utility is, in the very
nature of things, a limited class of the public ,13 though the classi-
fication must, of course, be one which is legally permissible, e. g.,
it would not be permissible for an innkeeper to hold himself out
to serve white persons only-such a holding out would include
others also-for, with respect to services essential to the public
welfare, the law for obvious reasons does not sanction a discrimina-
tion against persons solely on account of race.' But it would
seem to be permissible for an innkeeper to hold himself out to serve
women only, for a classification of the public into women and men
is based on reasons that may be conducive to the public good.
This point has been discussed at some length elsewhere in this
publication, and so will not be discussed here except incidentally.
To illustrate, the theatre business is not a public service,', prin-
cipally for the reason that it is not yet considered essential to the
welfare of the public or a permissible class of the public that
people should see shows. As now produced and regarded, shows
are rather in the class of luxuries--non-essentials-and often
unwholesome luxuries at that. Therefore a producer of shows
may deny admittance to his enemies,' 7 or charge them more than
he does his friends. The extraordinary affirmative duties imposed
upon those engaged in public businesses, e. g., the duty to serve all
as a rule, can be justified only in regard to essential services,
9 See authorities cited in footnote 36.
10 Allnut V. Inglis, 12 East. 527 (1810); Mun v. Illinois, 94 u. S. 113 (1876).
See also authorities cited in footnote 36.
11 Munn -,. Illinois, suprs, at p. 131.
"* Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249 (1710) Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N. Y. 341 (1867).
13 Wyman, "The Inherent Limitation of the Public Service Duty to Particular
Classes," 23 -ARV. L. REV. 339.
.4 Brown -v. Memphis etc. Ry. Co., 5 Fed. 499 (1880). See WYMA, op. cit., §565. 567.
15 26 W. VA. L. QUAs. 140-149.
10 Woolcott -v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, 111 N. E. 829 (1916) ; People v. Newman,
180 N. Y. Supp. 892 (1919).
17 See cases cited in footnote 16.
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though what is essential depends upon, and varies with, time, place
and prevailing public opinion. In order to justify the imposition
of these extraordinary affirmative duties it is necessary to balance
the individual interests of the persons conducting the business
and the social interests of those needing the services and the public
interests, i. e., the interest of the state, either as a juristic person or
as guardian of social interests, and see which interests outweigh
the others, i. e., which interests should be secured and which sac-
rificed. For the modern conception of the end of law is "to secure
as 'many interests as may be with as little sacrifice of other interests
as may be."' 8  And the public or social interests outweigh the
individual interest only where the service sought is an essential
service, e. g., electricity for illuminating purposes, 9 gas for heating
purposes,20 or water for domestic purposes.21  Hence, the limitation
that a business to be a public utility must be a business essential
to the welfare of a considerable class of the public.
Again, the practice of medicine is not now2  considered a public
service,22 chiefly for the reason that the business today is normally
not monopolistic in character, as usually competition can be counted
upon to regulate the business, partly perhaps for the further
reason that Anglo-American law hesitates to compel the per-
formance of purely personal services. Again, the business of let-
ting automobiles with drivers is not a public service unless there
is a holding out to serve a permissible class of the public, but if
there is such a holding out, the business is a public service.24  The
reasons are that while such a business is not an absolute monopoly
it is monopolistic in character in that the elements of time (the
immediate needs of the applicants), the expense in providing such
services and the consequent lack of competition, put the public at
the mercy of those conducting such businesses. And, since such
business is indisputably essential to the public welfare, the indi-
vidual interests of those conducting such a business are outweighed
partly by the public interest, partly by the social interests of those
needing such essential services, that is to say, are outweighed to
Is See POUND, OUTLINE OF A COURSE ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COM-
MON LAW, 3, 5; Pound, "Interests of Personality," 28 HARv. L. REV. 343, 445; Pound,
"The End of Iaw as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines," 27 HARv. L. REv. 195;
Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought," 27 HARV. L. REV. 605;
id., 30 HAny. L. REV. 201.
' Jones -. North Georgia Electric Co., 125 Ga. 618, 54 S. E. 85 (1906).Charleston Natural Gas Co. v. Lowe & Butler, 52 W. Va. 662, 44 S. 1. 410 (1901).
21 Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush. 60 (Mass. 1849).
2 As to the early law, see 1 'WYMAN, op. cit., § 6.
0 Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N. E. 1058 (1901).
24 Terminal Taxicab Co., Inc. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252 (1916).
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the extent that the state may reasonably25 regulate such businesses,
provided, of course, that those conducting such businesses have held
themselves out to render such services. Where, however, there is
no such holding out to serve, the individual interests of those who
so serve clearly outweigh the public or social interests of others
with respect to such services, when not specially contracted for,
since it would be outrageous to compel a man to enter upon a new
class of business. Therefore, those who do not in some way,
expressly or impliedly, hold themselves out to serve should not be
compelled to serve.26
By such reasoning it seems easy enough to justify the recent
decisions which have added to the list of public businesses such
enterprises as the following: the renting of houses,27 fire insur-
ance, s banking (public to a certain extent), s and the furnishing
of electric burglar alarms under certain circumstances.30 But how
about the recent decisions adding coal mining to the list of public
businesses ?31  Because of the fact that most of the mines that
can be operated economically are in the hands of comparatively
few, and because of the fact that considerable capital is required
in order to operate a mine so economically as to be able to compete
with the established mining companies, the business of mining coal
is often a "virtual monopoly," 3 2 not, of course, an absolute monop-
oly, but that, as we have seen, is not a necessary requirement.
Hence, the miners and mine-operators virtually have the public
at their mercy, unless the affirmative duties of public service law
are imposed with respect to this business, for the business is clearly
essential to the public welfare in that the life of the world is largely
dependent upon the production of coal. Moreover, there is nor-
mally a holding out to supply coal to the public or a considerable
class of the public. Therefore, since the modern conception of the
end of law is "to secure as many interests as may be with as little
sacrifice of other interests as may be," if we balance the interests
here involved it seems clear that the public and social interests in the
production of this essential commodity clearly outweigh the indi-
5 E. g., the state may not establish unreasonably low rates. Reagan u. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894).
See wyman, "The Inherent Limitation of the Public Service Duty to Particular
Classes," 23 HAav. L. R V. 339; 26 W. VA. L. QuAR. 140.
27 Block v. Hirsh, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (U. S. 1921) ; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (U. S. 1921).
s German Alliance Ins. Co. -v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911).30 Holmes Electric Protective Co. v. Williams, 228 N. Y. 407, 127 N. E. 315
(1920).
31 State v. I-owatt, 198 Pac. 686 (Kan. 1921) ; American Coal Mining Co. v. Special
Coal etc. Commission, 268 Fed. 563 (1920).
22 See Munn v. Illinois, supra.
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vidual interests of the mine-owners or miners to the extent that
the state may impose reasonable affirmative duties with respect
to the mining and sale of coal.
Hence, it would seem that, subject to the above-mentioned con-
ditions, the business of producing coal33 and perhaps of selling
coal otherwise than by the producers "4 may now properly be held
to have "ceased to be juris privati only" and to have "become
affected with a public interest." 3 5
The facts seem to establish between the coal producers and a
permissible class of the public a relation indistinguishable, for
present purposes, from the relation existing between the recognized
public utilities and patrons. If so, then, according to the better
view,36 there arises from this relation, irrespective of the wills of
the parties,37  such affirmative duties as, under the pre-
ponderant public opinion, the law thinks proper to impose upon
those producing coal, in order to secure, with the least sacrifice
of interests and with the sacrifice of the least important interests, not
only the public interest but the social interests and the individual
interests involved in this class of business. To hold so is quite
in accord with the modern salutary tendency toward a socialization
of the law38 at the expense of the extreme individualism of the law
which particularly during the prevalence of the now disfavored doc-
trine of laissez faire, so often sacrificed the ultimate and more im-
portant social interests at the shrine of the immediate but less
weighty individual interests.
-T. P. H.
NATURE OF JUDGMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT WHEN A VERDICT
IS SET ASIDE ON THE GROUND THAT A CONTRARY VERDICT SHOULD
HAvE BEEN DIRECTED IN THE LOWER COURT.-It seems to be con-
ceded that the original and long prevailing practice in West Vir-
ginia, upon setting aside a verdict in the Supreme Court upon
'3 American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal, etc. Commission, 268 Fed. [63 (1920)
State v. Howatt, supra.
14 See Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917). See 33 HARV. L.REv. 838.
But see Opinions of the Justices, 182 Mass. 605, 66 N. E. 25 (1904). Compare
Halter Hardware Co. v. Boyle, 263 Fed. 134 (1920) ; United States v. Cohen Grocery
Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921).
Is See Thomas P. Hardman, "The Right of a State to Restrain the Exportation of
Its Natural Resources," 26 W.VA. L. QUAR. 1, 16-18.
36 Inter Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E. 822
(1900) ; State v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 17 Neb. 126, 22 N. W. 237 (1885) ; Mc-
Carter v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 372, 73 Atil. 80 (1909). See Wyman,
"The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem", 17 HARv. L.
REV. 156, 217; BEAL & "WYMAN, RAILROAD RATE REGULATION, 2 ed., ch. 1. But
see contra authorities cited in footnote 8.
See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CObiMON LAw, 29.
. See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE ComsoN LAW, ch. 1, especially at p.
; h. 5, especially at p. 129; ch. 8, especially at p. 195.
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